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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. ; 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
) CASE NO. 20010443-CA 
) PRIORITY NO. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (i) (1999) . 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of pertinent statutes, rules, 
and constitutional provisions. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO.1: Did the trial court err by denying Ricks' Motion 
for Directed Verdict. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A jury verdict is upheld unless the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable 
as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. 
2 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was raised in a motion 
before the trial court. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Was Ricks denied effective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In challenging a conviction on 
the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is 
defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and 
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have 
been different but for counsel's error. State v. Geary, 
707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984). This issue is properly raised for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah 
App.1991) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David Anthony Ricks was charged by Information with 
one count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-103 and one count 
of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person, 
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a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503(1)(a) on September 12, 2000, amended to 
Possession of Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a 
Second Degree Felony, on October 31, 2000. On February 
27 and 28, 2001, Ricks was tried by a jury, and found 
guilty as charged. On May 11, 2001, a Judgment and 
Commitment to State Prison was entered, and Ricks was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed fifteen 
years in the State Prison. On May 18, 2001, Ricks filed 
a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Charene Martinez testified that during her employment 
at 7-Eleven, the appellant David Ricks used to visit the 
store as a customer up to six or seven times a day. R. 
149, 15:1-6. Charene testified that she never dated Mr. 
Ricks, nor gave him her address or telephone number. R. 
149, 15:7-18. She also testified that she did not even 
consider him a friend, but merely considered him a 
customer. R. 149, 15:25, 16:1-5. 
In August of 2000, Charene Martinez lived in a 
ground-floor apartment of an apartment complex located in 
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West Jordan, Utah. R. 149, 16:14-25, 17:1-6. She had 
lived at that location for about six months in August of 
2000, and Mr. Ricks had never visited her there prior to 
August 15, 2000. R. 149, 17:15-23. On that night, 
Charene had a "get-together'' at her apartment. R. 14 9, 
19:7-20. 
"Charene testified that at approximately 9:00 that 
night, she received a phone call from a man who 
identified himself as "Josh" and asked for her address. 
R. 149, 19:16-25, 20:5-11, 51:6-9. She testified that 
she had a friend named Josh and believed the caller was 
that friend, and therefore gave the caller her address. 
R. 149, 20:1-15. However, she testified that spoke to 
her friend Josh afterwards, and he said that he never 
called that night. R. 149, 20:18-22. 
Charene testified that in the early morning hours of 
August 16, 2000, she was cleaning up after the party with 
her friend Wes Burella when she heard a knock at the 
window. R. 149, 20:22-25, 21:1-4. She testified that 
she looked out the window and didn't see anyone, and 
looked out the peephole, but it was "covered with [a] 
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hand or something." R. 149, 21:15-25. She testified 
that she nevertheless opened the door "all the way/' 
thinking it might be a friend from the party who forgot 
something. R. 149, 22:3-23, 23:2-6. She testified that 
once she opened the door, she saw David Ricks standing 
there and that "he kind of just walked in." R. 149, 23:7-
10. She testified that she did not invite him in or say 
anything. R. 149, 23:11-12. She testified that she did 
not tell him to leave right away because she was "afraid 
of him." . 19-24. But she also testified that there had 
been no prior animosity between them, R. 149, 49:20-25, 
and that he was fairly pleasant and he was not acting 
angry or threatening when he arrived. R. 149, 53:17-25. 
Charene testified that Mr. Ricks did not say anything 
to her, but simply walked in and sat down in a chair next 
to her front door. R. 149, 24:1-3, 24:16-17. She 
testified that after Mr. Ricks sat down, she went and sat 
by her friend Wes on the sofa. R. 149, 24:18-21. She 
testified that Mr. Ricks seemed happy when he first 
arrived, but that his faced changed and that he seemed 
upset after he saw Wes. R. 149, 43;17-23. She testified 
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that the couch on which she and Wes were sitting was 
touching the chair on which Mr. Ricks was sitting. R. 
149, 26:1-8. She testified that they were sitting on the 
couch so that Wes was closer to Mr. Ricks. R. 149, 26:1-
2. She testified that for several minutes, nothing was 
said by either her, Wes, or Mr. Ricks. R. 149, 26:10-25. 
During that time, she did not ask Mr. Ricks to leave. R. 
149, 26:17-19. 
Charene testified that she decided to call the 
police, and got up and headed for the phone. R. 14 9:27:1-
2. She testified that the phone rang as she went toward 
it, and she answered it. Ft. 149, 27:17-18. She testified 
that she talked to the caller "Pat" about a party at 
Pat's house. R. 149, 27:19-25. However, when reminded 
that she had testified at the preliminary hearing that 
"Chad" was the caller that night, she denied that she had 
previously said it was "Chad," and testified that she had 
said at the preliminary hearing that "Chad and Pat" were 
on the phone. R. 149, 55:15-25, 56:1-5. However, she 
then testified at trial that it was not "Chad and Pat," 
but just Pat who called that night. R. 56:3-8. When 
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asked whether she meant that it was just Pat, she 
answered, "Or somebody." R. 149:12-13. Chad Studham 
testified that it was Pat who called Charene, and that he 
was present when the call was made. R. 149, 81:17-25, 
82:1-11 
At trial, Charene said that she did not know how Mr. 
Ricks and her brother-in-law, Chad Studham, knew each 
other, and further, she denied that she knew that the two 
men had been in prison together. R. 149, 48:20-25, 49:1-
13. However, at the preliminary hearing, she testified 
that Mr. Chadham knew Mr. Ricks because they were in 
prison together. R. 149, 57:3-5. Mr. Chadham testified 
that he knew Mr. Ricks from prison. R. 149, 81:17-24. 
Charene testified that while she was talking to Pat 
on the phone, Mr. Ricks and her friend Wes were having a 
conversation. R. 149, 28:21-25. She testified that she 
"tried to change [her] voice up and down" so that the 
caller would know something was wrong, R. 149, 28:6-8, 
but did not specifically say that anything was wrong 
because she did not feel comfortable saying anything in 
front of Mr. Ricks. R. 149, 28:16-20. However, she also 
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testified that she went outside with the phone to smoke 
a cigarette, and still did not mention to the caller that 
anything was wrong because she "was just hoping that he 
would know something was wrong." R. 149, 29:1-10, 30:1-
6. On cross-examination, she testified that she didn't 
tell the caller anything was wrong while she was outside 
because she was afraid Mr. Ricks would overhear. R. 149, 
58:2-10. While outside with the phone, she did not call 
the police. 
Charene testified that, after terminating her phone 
conversation with Pat, she went back inside the apartment 
and sat on the couch next to Wes. R. 149, 1-10. She 
testified that as she went over to the sofa, she heard 
Mr. Ricks telling Wes that she was a slut and that Wes 
would "never get a chance with [her]." R. 149, 30:11-14. 
She testified that as she was sitting on the sofa, Mr. 
Ricks asked her what she was doing, and that she replied 
that she was going to go to sleep. R. 149, 31:9-14. She 
testified that Mr. Ricks Mgot up like he was leaving," 
R. 149, 31:15-17, but instead approached Wes and 
"grabbed Wes' right hand with his left hand, like he was 
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shaking his hand "bye" and then "with his right hand, hit 
[Charene] in the face." R. 149, 31:18-12, 32:1-6. 
Charene first testified without hesitation that Mr. Ricks 
hit her on the left side of the face with his right hand. 
R. 149, 32:11-15, but when asked again, she answered that 
she could not recall which side of the face he hit her 
on. R. 149, 32:16-17. She testified at trial that as he 
hit her, Mr. Ricks said, "This is the last time you fuck 
with me bitch." R. 149, 32:24-25. However, in describing 
the incident to the police that night, she did not 
mention that Mr. Ricks had made this particular 
statement. R. 149, 59:14-25, 60:1-5. 
Charene testified that she got up from the sofa after 
Mr. Ricks hit her, and told him to get out of her 
apartment. R. 149, 33:3-9. She testified that Mr. Ricks 
walked backwards the three or four feet to the door, R. 
149, 33:11-12, 20-25, 34:1-5. She testified that she 
"walked towards him," R. 14 9, 33:4, and that she "was 
mad" and asked him "why he kept following [her] and why 
he was there." R. 149, 17-19. She testified that Mr. 
Ricks was calling her names, like "bitch" and "slut" and 
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"cunt," and that she was screaming back to Mr. Ricks. R. 
149, 61:24-25. She testified that when Mr. Ricks reached 
the door, he reached back and opened it. R. 149, 34:13-
15. She testified that during all of this, her friend 
Wes remained sitting on the couch and did not do 
anything. R. 149, 34:16-19. 
Charene testified that as she was approaching Mr. 
Ricks, her head suddenly hit the barrel of a gun. R. 
149, 35:9-10. She said she "walked right into it." R. 
14 9, 35:10. She testified that she couldn't remember 
whether she told the police that she physically "walked 
into the barrel of the gun." R. 149, 62:20-25, 63:1-2. 
She testified that she did not see Mr. Ricks pull the 
gun, but merely saw him "moving his shirt" as she moved 
toward him. R. 149, 35:13-25. Mr. Ricks had on shorts 
and a t-shirt that night. R. 149, 62:14-16., 84:9-10. She 
described the gun as "a little one," that was "black" or 
"grey kind of," and "a normal gun" of the type "you had 
to pull back on." R. 149, 36:2-6. 
She testified that her friend Wes Barella finally got 
up and walked up behind her, and told Mr. Ricks to "drop 
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the gun and to leave." R. 149, 36:15-18. She testified 
that Wes Barella was smaller physically then her. R. 149, 
63:11-22. She testified that Mr. Ricks then pulled the 
gun away, and "cocked the thing back," and then pushed 
the gun against the side of her head. R. 149, 37:4-23. 
She testified that while he held the gun to her head, he 
continued calling her names and yelling at her. R. 149, 
37:25, 38:1-5. She testified that Mr. Ricks said that 
"[she] should die'7 among other things, but testified that 
she couldn't remember everything he said. R. 149, 38:6-
11. She also testified that she couldn't remember 
whether she had told the police about the "should die" 
statement. R. 149, 63:23-25, 64:1-5. 
She testified that after "awhile," Mr. Ricks began 
moving backwards out the door. R. 149, 38:24-25, 39:1-6. 
She testified that she pushed Mr. Ricks out the door, and 
shut and locked the door. R. 149, 39:6-7. When cross-
examined about whether she truly pushed Mr. Ricks out the 
door, she answered, "I guess," R. 149, 65:16-23, and 
finally stated, "I don't really remember what happened." 
R. 149, 65:20-24. She testified that after closing the 
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door, she went to the ground and pulled Wes with her. R. 
149:10-18. She testified that she had her phone in her 
hand throughout the incident, and just pushed redial from 
where she was on the floor. R. 149, 39:11-22. She 
testified that her sister answered the phone, R. 149, 
39:22-25, and although she didn't remember what she said 
to her sister, she remembered crying, and her sister 
telling her to call 911." R. 149, 40:8-11. She 
testified that she initially pressed "redial," instead of 
calling 911, because she was scared and "didn't think to 
dial 911." R. 149, 40:15-17. 
She testified that during the time she was talking to 
her sister, she could hear Mr. Ricks pounding on the door 
with the gun, and tapping on the window with some object. 
R. 149, 41:3-13. She testified that she heard Mr. Ricks 
yelling from outside, calling her names and threatening 
her. R. 149, 76:1-6. She testified that the pounding and 
tapping stopped right when she hung up from the call to 
her sister. R. 149, 41:14-18. She testified that she 
couldn't remember whether she told the police about Mr. 
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Ricks pounding on the door and yelling after he was 
outside. R. 149, 66:11-25. 
After talking to her sister, Charene did call the 911 
operator. R. 149, 40:18-25. She testified that Chad 
Studham, her brother-in-law, arrived at her apartment 
while she was on the phone with the 911 operator. R. 
149, 41:19-23. Mr. Studham testified that as he 
approached Charene's apartment, he saw Mr. Ricks "walking 
out of the side of the building that Charene lived in." 
R. 149, 83:22-25. Mr. Studham testified that Mr. Ricks 
walked casually away from the building, and get into a 
dark-colored truck and drive away. R. 149, 85:1-12. Mr. 
Studham testified that he shined "spotlight lamp" that he 
was carrying directly at Mr. Ricks, but that Mr. Ricks 
did not respond in any way. T. 149, 84:18-25, 91:1-10. 
He further testified that he went to Charene's apartment 
after Mr. Ricks left, and that Charene would not open the 
door immediately, and did so only after Mr. Studham 
identified himself. R. 149, 87:1-8. He testified that 
Charene was very emotional and had a red mark on her 
face. R. 149, 87:9-13. The police arrived shortly 
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thereafter. T. 149, 44:10-12. 
West Jordan Police Officer Mark Slade testified that 
the 911 call was received at 1:32 a.m., and that he 
arrived at Charene's apartment shortly after that. R. 
149, 95:1-25. Officer Slade testified that he asked 
Charene just enough questions about the incident to 
determine what had happened and whether a crime had been 
committed. R. 149, 96:13-25, 97:1-7. He testified that 
Charene was emotional, and was crying and then angry when 
he was interviewing her. R. 149, 97:17-23. He testified 
that Charene told him Mr. Ricks had slapped her in the 
face, R. 149, 98:2-5, and then "pulled the gun from his 
waistband area, and racked a round in a loading motion." 
R. 149, 99:1-4. He testified that he examined Charene's 
face, and did not detect any redness or swelling. R. 149, 
98:6-12. 
Ten or twenty minutes after the police arrived, Mr. 
Ricks called Charene's apartment. R. 149, 44:18-25, 
45:1. Charene answered the phone, and when she realized 
that it was Mr. Ricks, she handed the phone to one of the 
police officers that was there. R. 149, 45:19-25. She 
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testified, "When I talk to [David] , he never lets me 
talk. He just starts going." R. 45:22-23. She 
testified that she got on another phone to continue the 
conversation with Mr. Ricks. R. 45:23-25. She testified 
that she asked Mr. Ricks why he hit her, and that he 
answered "because . . ." and then changed, and said, 
"You're a lying bitch." R. 149, 45:3-7. She also 
testified that he said "[she] deserved to get smacked 
and [she] ain't better than anybody." R. 149, 45:11-13. 
Officer Slade testified that while he was listening 
on the phone, he heard Charene ask, "Why did you tell me 
your name was Josh?" and heard the other person say, "I 
didn't. I said my name was David." R. 149, 101:11-14. 
He testified that he also heard Charene ask, "Why did you 
hit [me]?" and the other person, a male, answered, "Well, 
because . . .," and then after a pause, the male said 
"something to the effect of he is not stupid." R. 149, 
102:4-7. He testified that he heard Charene ask the male 
again, "Why did you hit me and pull a gun on me?", and 
that the male answered, "I don't know what you're talking 
about." R. 149, 102:16-22. 
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Officer Slade testified that he retrieved the phone 
number of the male caller, and was informed by dispatch 
that the number belonged to David Ricks. R. 149, 103:16-
25, 104:1-2. Charene Martinez testified that Mr. Ricks 
called her apartment twice while the police were there, 
and a couple of times after the police left. R. 149, 
46:16-18. 
Officer Slade testified once the officers made sure 
the immediate threat was gone, the other two officers 
left Charene's apartment, and Mr. Slade stayed and spoke 
to Charene. R. 149, 107:13-17. He testified that Charene 
Martinez never mentioned to him, on the night of the 
incident, that Mr. Ricks had verbally threatened her. R. 
149, 109:16-21. And in fact, based on Charene's 
representations, Officer Slade wrote in his report, 
"Ricks did not make any threats to Martinez." R. 149, 
109:25, 110:1-4. Slade also testified that Charene never 
mentioned to him that the gun physically touched her in 
any way, or that she "bumped into the gun." R. 14 9, 
110:6-19. 
Officer Slade testified that Charene did not tell him 
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that Mr. Ricks had come into her apartment and sat down 
calmly for some time. R. 149, 111:23-25. In fact, he 
testified that she told him that Mr. Ricks started 
yelling right when he walked into the apartment. R. 14 9, 
11:19-22. Charene also did not mention that the apartment 
door was open when Mr. Ricks was allegedly holding a gun 
to her head in the doorway, and that people walked by 
outside during the incident. R. 149, 111:10-18. 
Charene testified that she talked to several 
different police officers on the night of the incident, 
and that she told different bits and pieces of the story 
to different officers. R. 149, 73:1-5. She testified 
that she did not feel that she had a chance to tell her 
whole story that night. R. 149, 73:16-18. 
Finally, Kevin Judd, a police officer with the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office, testified that he made an 
attempt to locate Wes Burella, for the purpose of having 
him testify at trial, but was unable to locate him. R. 
149, 142:1-8. Officer Judd also testified that he has 
some expert knowledge of handguns and demonstrated the 
action required to prepare a semi-automatic pistol for 
18 
firing. R. 149, 143:11-25, 144:1-15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it denied Ricksf motion 
for directed verdict on both counts, where there was 
insufficient evidence that Ricks possessed or used a 
firearm. Additionally, Ricks was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed 
to request severance of the two counts, thereby causing 
the admission of prejudicial evidence of his prior 
criminal conviction, which was relevant only to the 
charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, to be considered by the jury on the 
aggravated assault charge. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict. 
Motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings 
are governed by U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-3 and Rule 17(o) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 77-
35-17 (o)) . Section 77-17-3 requires the immediate 
discharge of a defendant "[w]hen it appears to the court 
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that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant 
to his defense." Rule 17 (o) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure authorizes the dismissal of an entire 
information or indictment, or any count thereof, either 
at the end of State's evidence or at the close of all the 
evidence " upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense." 
The standard for determining whether an order denying 
a motion for directed verdict is erroneous is the same as 
that applied by an appellate court in determining whether 
a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient 
evidence. Under that standard, a jury verdict is upheld 
unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that 
element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); 
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State 
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
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When the evidence presented is conflicting or 
disputed, the jury generally serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
to be given particular evidence. See e.g. State v. 
Myers, 606 P. 2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980). However, a 
reviewing court may evaluate whether the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Petree, 659 P.2d at 445; see also State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 
1108, 1114 (Utah 1989) (opinion of Stewart, J., stating 
the position of the Court). 
In the instant case, Ricks was convicted of 
Aggravated Assault and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon 
by a Restricted Person, with of which "possession of 
firearm or dangerous weapon" is an element. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-103 (governing aggravated 
assault) provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 
and he: 
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection (1) (a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6-1-
601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a)(governing possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person) provides 
that: A [person previously convicted of a violent felony] 
who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under 
his custody or control . . . any firearm is guilty of a 
second degree felony." 
The only evidence presented at trial regarding the 
possession or use of a weapon by Ricks was the testimony 
of Charene Martinez, which, as discussed below, was so 
contradictory as to be "inherently improbable." 
For instance, Charene testified at trial that she 
"walked into" the barrel of the gun. R. 149, 62:20-25. 
And yet Officer Slade, the officer who spoke to Charene 
that night, testified that she never mentioned "walking 
into" the gun, or having had any physical contact with 
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the gun at all. R. 149, 110:6-19. Charene also 
testified at trial that she "pushed" Ricks out of her 
door as he stood there with the gun pointed at her head, 
R. 149, 39:6-7, and then upon being questioned further, 
she stated that she did not actually remember whether she 
pushed him or not. R. 149, 65:20-24. She also testified 
that some people walked outside by as she and Ricks stood 
in the open doorway of her apartment, with Ricks holding 
a gun to her head. R. 149, 65:1-11. Yet, this was 
another "fact" that she did not mention to Officer Slade. 
R. 149, 65:12-15. 
Clearly, Charene's testimony regarding this incident 
in effect, that Charene was charging toward David Ricks 
as he backed up to the door, when suddenly she ran face-
first into the barrel of a gun, and that some people 
walked by outside while she stood there in the doorway 
with a gun pointed to her head, and that she then pushed 
David Ricks out the door and locked the door — is so 
highly improbable that her testimony alone cannot support 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Her testimony is rendered all the more inconclusive 
by the many contradictions in her testimony. For example, 
she testified at trial that Ricks threatened to kill her, 
and yet, did not mention that fact to Officer Slade 
either. R. 149, 109:25, 110:1-4. 
Moreover, Charene testified that she was frightened 
of Ricks from the moment he arrived at her apartment, and 
yet she did not ask him to leave, or inform him at all 
that he was not welcome. Additionally, she testified 
that either Pat or Chad called her while Ricks was 
sitting on the chair, and that she could not tell the 
caller that she was frightened and needed help because 
Ricks was sitting nearby and would overhear, R. 149, 
29:1-10, and yet, she went outside her apartment with the 
telephone and still did not inform the caller of her 
alleged fears, and did not call the police, which she 
asserted was her intent in picking up the phone in the 
first place. R. 149, 149, 27:1-2. Moreover, she went 
back into her apartment and sat on the sofa near Ricks 
after picking up the phone for the purported purpose of 
calling the police because she was afraid of Ricks, and 
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not doing so. R. 149, 30:1-10. 
She also testified that Ricks sat calmly in her 
apartment before any kind of disturbance occurred, and 
yet, she told Officer Slade that Ricks began yelling from 
the moment he walked into her apartment. R. 14 9, 11:19-
22. 
Finally, with regards to the phone conversations 
overheard by Officer Slade, it was only in response to 
the question "Why did you hit me?" that Ricks was alleged 
to have answered, Well, because . . . ." R. 149, 102:4-
7. R., 149, 45:23-25. Thus, that evidence did not support 
the allegation that Ricks used a gun, but simply that he 
may have struck Charene. 
In sum, the testimony of Charene Martinez was so 
improbable, that it does not constitute proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ricks possessed or used a dangerous 
weapon. 
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II. Ricks was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Generally, to successfully claim ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy a 
two-part test established by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland and recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Under this 
test, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 
1203-04. 
To show counsel's performance was deficient, a 
defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or 
omissions that "fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. To show prejudice, a 
defendant must show that "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064. Under this prong of the test, the defendant must 
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show that a "reasonable probability" exists that the 
trial result would have been different if counsel had 
not erred. Id^ at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723 
P.2d at 405. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 
2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06. 
Ricks' trial counsel rendered his representation 
constitutionally deficient by failing to request that the 
two counts be severed so that the evidence on the 
aggravated felony charge would be heard separately from 
the evidence on the "felon in possession" charge. 1 Under 
Generally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal 
because the trial record is insufficient to allow the claim 
to be determined. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991). An appellant, however, can raise such a 
claim if the trial record is adequate to permit 
determination of the issue and there is new counsel on 
appeal. I_d^_; State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah 
App.1991). In the instant case, Coonce believed the record 
was inadequate to properly permit determination of many 
aspects of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and 
filed a motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
23B requesting that the case be remanded for the trial court 
to enter findings of fact relevant to his claim. His motion 
was denied by this Court, and Coonce therefore argues his 
claim based on the existing record. 
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Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "two or 
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or 
information in a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged arise out of a criminal episode . . . ." 
In the instant case, all of the charges against defendant 
arose from the same criminal episode. Thus, joinder of 
the charges was admittedly proper in the first instance. 
Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 9 further provides, however: 
If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or 
information, or by a joinder for trial together, 
the court shall order an election of separate 
trials of separate counts, or grant a severance 
of defendants, or provide such other relief as 
justice requires. 
In the instant case, but for the joinder, evidence 
that Ricks was a convicted felon and had previously been 
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison would not have been 
inadmissible at trial on the aggravated assault charge 
under Utah R. Evid. Rule 404 which provides "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith." 
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Evidence that defendant was a convicted felon was 
clearly relevant to prove a fact other than criminal 
disposition material to the offense of possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person; however, this evidence 
was not relevant to the aggravated assault charge, except 
to show a criminal disposition as the basis for an 
inference that he was guilty. Thus, at a separate trial 
on the aggravated assault charges, this evidence would 
have been inadmissible under Rule 404. 
The admission of this evidence was clearly 
prejudicial to Ricks' defense with regards to the 
aggravated assault case. As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, (1985): 
The basis of these limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused 
because of bad character rather than because he 
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged. 
Because of this tendency, such evidence is 
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for 
the admission of the evidence other than to show 
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded. 
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In Saunders, the Supreme Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary, and held 
that fail to sever, resulting in the admission of 
evidence regarding the defendant's past criminal conduct 
was prejudicial. 
Clearly, the failure of Ricks' counsel to move for 
severance, resulting in the admission of highly 
prejudicial character evidence, !!fall[s] outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance.11 State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). Moreover, pursuant 
to Saunders, this error was clearly prejudicial. 
Accordingly, Ricks was denied his right under the Sixth 
Amendment to competent counsel, and his conviction should 
be vacated on that basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ricks respectfully requests 
that his conviction be vacated and remanded to the trial 
court for entry of a verdict of not guilty. 
DATED this <£/ day/of £^cem^er>^ 2002. 
[Zi 
SHXRON PRESTON 
Attorney for David Ricks 
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Utah Code Section 76-5-103 Page 1 of 1 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and 
he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Amended by Chapter 291, 1995 General Session 
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76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of dangerous 
weapons by certain persons. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category 1 restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101; or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an 
adult would have been a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by 
an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally in unlawful 
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental 
institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody 
or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody 
or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another section for one who 
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the 
penalties of that section control. 
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